Ensure reliable & trustworthy election technologies
Electronic voting machines are insecure, unreliable, and prone to a variety of problems that undermine trust in our elections process. Optical scanners and other technologies have some problems as well.
The CTO can create a clear roadmap to get reliable, trustworthy, verifiable voting technology into every precinct in America by the time of the 2010 elections.
Additionally, the CTO should employ information designers to create a national standard for ballot designs so that all citizens are ensured the right to a ballot that is clear, easy to use, and reliable.

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the zapkitty commented
Analysis part 11
Since the mid-20th century it's been useful to the politicos, election officials, and corporations for the American "consumer" to be lulled into a since of complacency about elections, to have them think of voting as a quick, mechanized chore one did before or after work before getting back to the serious business of consuming... and then watching results on the evening news.
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the zapkitty commented
While I'm helping Stan 314 understand his budding Ivotronic addiction, my analysis will continue with the 2000's...
When the EVM insanity spiraled to infinity and beyond and the first organized resistance to EVMs began fighting... and infighting... When paper trails and open source as EVM solutions blossomed and then faded. And just how Holt's reform bill went from good idea to utter fiasco.
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the zapkitty commented
Reply to Stan 314 addendum
Bad link for the Florida report on
ES&S Ivotronic flaws. Sorry!Report from the Ohio Secretary of State is just as damning:
http://www.bbvdocs.org/ESS/EVEREST-ESS.pdfAnd latest paper trail hack can be undetectable even with full recount. Is for Sequoia and not tried on ES&S yet but outlook does not look good:
http://www.bradblog.com/?p=6369 -
the zapkitty commented
Reply to Stan314 part 2 of 2
And it is a matter of faith... not science:
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/pdf/FinalAudRepSAIT.pdf
http://www.bradblog.com/?p=6671
http://www.usenix.org/event/evt08/tech/full_papers/aviv/aviv_html/
http://vote.nist.gov/threats/papers/papertrailhack2.pdf -
the zapkitty commented
Reply to Stan314 part 1 of 2
Stan314 said:
"Hmm. I used the eletronic system in Henderson, NV and was very impressed:..."
Congratulations! Welcome to faith-based voting! Please enjoy your newfound religion to your heart's content... just don't mind the rest of us if we want to stop Congress from making the beliefs of your new faith into laws governing how the rest of us vote.
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Stan314 commented
Hmm. I used the eletronic system in Henderson, NV and was very impressed:
1. It pointed out an issue I forgot to vote for on.
2. It presented an eletronic view of my votes and let me review and change them.
3. It then printed a machine scanable copy for my final review - to be used for recounts.
That seems pretty safe to me - just randomly recount and compare. -
the zapkitty commented
Analysis part 10
And all the while certain parties practiced very hard on all the OTHER ways of stealing elections. Voter suppression schemes, electoral officials abusing their powers to game the ballots and even the polling places themselves etc... It was all an old game in electoral politics, but now people were working to a semi-coherent scheme and laying long-range groundwork.
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the zapkitty commented
Analysis part 9
So it continued through the 1990's, with the very large elephant of intrinsically insecure EVM's standing in the middle of the living room and crapping all over American elections with relatively few people wanting... or daring... to point out the mess.
And the elephant grew...
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the zapkitty commented
Interlude
My analysis, while long for this format even now, is not as detailed as even a cursory examination of the subject should be. I'm just focusing here on the facts that bear on exactly why the vague proposal by jesse_kocher is such a very ill-advised approach to actually solving the ongoing mess.
And yes all this background will help to understand what the problem is.
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the zapkitty commented
Analysis part 8
So... the corporate types were often whispering their bland reassurances into the ears of government types who had been working for them a year ago. And they handwaved "security" by invoking "trained personnel" and "polling place controls"... even though the "trained personnel" in the "controlled polling places" were actually the *most* capable and the *most* likely to tamper...
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the zapkitty commented
Analysis part 7
And thus the fact that the concept of voting by EVMs, e-voting, had certain fatal flaws was... understated... by corporations and corporate and government scientists who instead went about spinning their own reality of "just good enough" or "fixable in the future."
For you see, the corporate/government revolving door program was operating at full spin overdrive...
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the zapkitty commented
Analysis part 6
Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) had arrived... and even then it was being pointed out that it was impossible to secure EVM's against fraud.
http://www.thelandesreport.com/1985.htm
http://www.itl.nist.gov/lab/specpubs/500-158.htm/lab/specpubs/500-158.htmBut people were always being
reassured that the level of fraud could be *minimized*... in the future... -
the zapkitty commented
Analysis part 5
Electronic vote tabulation began sneaking into elections in the 1960's, gradually increasing its sway over elections as each year saw an ever-increasing percentage of the votes cast nationwide being counted by software.
And problems, studies and warnings issued by those studies all increased as well. By the 1980's things were really heating up.
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the zapkitty commented
Analysis part 4
And the reason for this is the prize at stake: Control of the wealthiest (before the economy was wrecked and the treasury drained) and most powerful (before military was driven into the ground) nation on Earth.
So how did we get here... a situation where technology that is insanely easy to game is actually running elections? And why do I say that technology can't get us out?
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the zapkitty commented
Analysis part 3
One of the differences in emphasis that needs to be applied to elections is that in game theory you assume that all users are attempting to "game" the system at all times.
You *plan* for an environment where everyone lies, everyone cheats, and everyone steals everything that isn't nailed down :)
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the zapkitty commented
Analysis part 2
This distinction between technology and game theory is important.
Remember the adage "If the only tool you have is a hammer, then everything starts looking like nails"... ?
Election integrity has many components, and technology is only one of them.
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the zapkitty commented
And part 2 won't post... waiting for feedback from uservoice.
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the zapkitty commented
Analysis, part 1 of... whatever is required.
What we have in jesse_kocher's proposal is a vague statement that reeks of "Tech Über Alles" in the area of election integrity and election reform.
But election integrity and election reform are NOT technologies... they are actually exercises in *game theory*.
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the zapkitty commented
Hmmm... some comments go through, others don't. Criteria? Will ask...
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the zapkitty commented
Australian e-voting supporters, especially in the government, do love to talk up their system, and by the time the Wired Magazine article got through with it... it had become "Australia's Universally Used and Much Beloved Open Source E-Voting System and Cure for Cancer"... which, it seems, is how much of the world still thinks of it today.